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Abstract 
For many real time applications, it is impor­
tant to validate the information received from 
the sensors before entering higher levels of 
reasoning. This paper presents an any time 
probabilistic algorithm for validating the in­
formation provided by sensors. The sys­
tem consists of two Bayesian network mod­
els. The first one is a model of the dependen­
cies between sensors and it is used to validate 
each sensor. It provides a list of potentially 
faulty sensors. To isolate the real faults, a 
second Bayesian network is used, which re­
lates the potential faults with the real faults. 
This second model is also used to make the 
validation algorithm any time, by validating 
first the sensors that provide more informa­
tion. To select the next sensor to validate, 
and measure the quality of the results at each 
stage, an entropy function is used. This func­
tion captures in a single quantity both the 
certainty and specificity measures of any time 
algorithms. Together, both models consti­
tute a mechanism for validating sensors in an 
any time fashion, providing at each step the 
probability of correct/faulty for each sensor, 
and the total quality of the results. The al­
gorithm has been tested in the validation of 
temperature sensors of a power plant. 
1 Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are playing an 
increasingly important role in real applications. In in­
dustry, different techniques have been proposed, for 
example, in diagnosis, automatic control, and moni­
toring. Generally, these applications require an over­
all model which usually, its inputs are mainly sensors. 
Also, many of these real applications need to main­
tain a real time behaviour, i.e., the correctness of the 
system depends not only on the logical result of the 
computation but also on the time at which the results 
are produced (Stankovic 1988]. Usually, real applica-
tions possess a time limit by which some actions must 
be performed. 
This paper presents a model for the validation of the 
sensors used in real time applications. The proposed 
validation is carried out in a separate module that 
works together with other functions in a system. In 
other words, it is assumed that a layered scheme is 
used in which the lowest level concentrates on validat­
ing the signals transmitted by the sensors as presented 
in Fig. 1 (Yung & Clarke 1989]. The main benefit of 
Figure 1: Layered diagnosis architecture. 
using a layered approach is that it enables the con­
struction of models in a modular fashion. That is, it is 
easier to construct a model for sensor validation and 
then a model for the process than it is to construct 
an overall model in one step. This separation of the 
sensor validation layer can also result in simpler higher 
layer models and leave the higher layers to utilize other 
techniques. 
Faults in the sensors readings are detected in a decen­
tralised and hierarchical approach, so that they can 
be easily isolated and repaired. Additionally, suppose 
that the higher layers of the system represent other 
important and critical functions, e.g., the fault diag­
nosis of a nuclear plant. The intermediate layer (loop 
diagnosis) may be using model based reasoning to di­
agnose a control loop in the plant, whereas the system 
diagnosis layer may be utilizing a different approach. 
The validation module presented in this paper, utilizes 
a probabilistic model which considers only the rela­
tionships between the variables to be validated.· This 
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probabilistic model is independent of the higher layers 
models, so it is easier to construct and mantain when 
necessary. 
This paper presents the continuation of the project 
described in a previous paper [Ibargiiengoytia et al. 
1996]. In that paper, the authors described a proba­
bilistic approach to sensor validation that took advan­
tage of a Markov blanket property to distinguish real 
faults from apparent faults. A Bayesian network was 
used as a basis for predicting a probability distribu­
tion for a sensor value based on other sensors. The 
predicted distribution and the actual sensor reading 
was used in order to determine if there was a potential 
fault. 
However, the sensor validation process described in 
that paper works in batch mode, i.e., no intermedi­
ate results are available, and no attempt is made to 
estimate the quality of the results. For a real time 
application, these characteristics are inadequate. This 
paper presents the extension of the sensor validation 
algorithm, so it can be applied in real time systems. 
This consists in the use of any time algorithms. 
Thus, the extension of the sensor validation algorithm 
consists in the following features. First, the use of a 
probabilistic causal network that relates the real and 
apparent faults. Second, in order to perform in any 
time basis, the validation algorithm selects the sensor 
which provides more information when validated. Fi­
nally, a quality function is calculated in order to char­
acterize the behaviour of the algorithm. The selection 
of the most informative sensor is made using the en­
tropy function. 
To summarize, this paper presents an any time prob­
abilistic algorithm for validating the information pro­
vided by sensors. The system consists of two Bayesian 
network models. The first one is a model of the de­
pendencies between sensors and it is used to validate 
each sensor. It provides a list of potentially faulty 
sensors. To isolate the real faults, a second Bayesian 
network is used, which relates the potential faults with 
the real faults. This second model is also used to make 
the validation algorithm any time, by validating first 
the sensors that provide more information. To select 
the next sensor to validate, and measure the quality 
of the results at each stage, an entropy function is 
used. Together, both models constitute a mechanism 
for validating sensors in an any time fashion, providing 
at each step the probability of correct/faulty for each 
sensor, and the total quality of the results. 
The next section briefly describes the basis of any time 
algorithms. 
2 Any Time Algorithms 
Any time algorithms represent one direction of work 
that aims to achieve the use of artificial intelligence 
techniques in real time systems. This term was ini-
tially used by Dean in his research about time depen­
dent planning [Dean & Boddy 1988]. At the same 
time, Horvitz (1987) proposed the name of flexible 
computation for this mechanism. Any time algorithms 
are those that can be interrupted at any point dur­
ing computation, and return an answer whose value 
increases as it is allocated additional time [Boddy & 
Dean 1994]. However, how can this value be mea­
sured in a specific application? The literature con­
tains descriptions of different dimensions that have 
been proposed as metrics [Zilberstein & Russell 1996]: 
certainty, accuracy and specificity. 
Performance profiles represent the expected value of 
these metrics for a given procedure as a function of 
time. In other words, performance profiles character­
ize the quality of an algorithm's output as a function 
of computation time. Figure 2 illustrates three cases 
of performance profiles [Zilberstein & Russell 1996], 
[Dean & Boddy 1988]: 
q 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 2: Examples of performance profiles. (a) a 
standard or one shot algorithm. (b) an ideal, expo­
nential precision algorithm, and (c) a more realistic 
profile for an any time algorithm in practice. 
Clearly, all these types of performance profiles are spe­
cial cases of a superclass that can be defined as mono­
tonic improvement, i.e., the quality of its intermediate 
results does not decrease as more time is spent to pro­
duce the result. The next section explains the basis of 
the validation algorithm, so that section 4 develops the 
any time algorithm for the sensor validation problem. 
3 Sensor Validation 
The probabilistic sensor validation model utilizes 
Bayesian networks. The nodes represent the measures 
of the sensors. The structure of the network makes ex­
plicit the dependence relations between the variables. 
The probabilistic sensor validation includes the diag­
nosis of all single sensors in the network. The idea 
is to instantiate all the nodes with the sensor read­
ings, except the one being validated. A probabilistic 
propagation provides a distribution of the posterior 
probability of the estimation of a signal value based 
on the readings of the most related signals. The esti­
mated value is then compared with the current value 
in order to decide if the measurement is correct. The 
most closely related variables for each sensor consist 
of a Markov blanket of the sensor variable. A Markov 
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blanket is defined as the set of variables that makes a 
variable independent from the others. In a Bayesian 
network, the following three sets of neighbours is suffi­
cient for forming a Markov blanket of a node: the set 
of direct predecessors, direct successors, and the direct 
predecessors of the successors (i.e. parents, children, 
and spouses) [Pearl 1988]. The set of variables that 
constitutes the Markov blanket of a variable can be 
seen as a protection of this variable against changes of 
variables outside the blanket. This means that, in or­
der to analyze a variable, it is only necessary to know 
the value of all variables in its blanket [Ibargiiengoytia 
et al. 1996]. Additionally, the extended Markov blan­
ket (EMB) of a sensor is formed by its Markov blanket 
plus the variable itself. 
However, since validating a sensor based on a faulty 
one results in an erroneous validation, the probabilis­
tic validation only provides a list of apparent faults. 
Thus, the probabilistic validation provides a list of po­
tential correct and potential faulty sensors. The fault 
isolation is carried out when the list of potential faulty 
sensors is compared with the list of EMB of each sen­
sor. When a match exists, then the faulty sensor has 
been distinguished. Otherwise, different conditions ex­
ist for the isolation of multiple failures [Ibargiiengoytia 
et al. 1996]. The next section describes the extensions 
of the sensor validation model in order to discriminate 
faulty and correct sensors in an any time basis. 
4 Any Time Sensor Validation 
Any time sensor validation algorithm implies that the 
knowledge about the state of the sensors (faulty or cor­
rect) becomes more certain and complete as time pro­
gresses. Certainty about the state of a sensor refers to 
the degree of belief in the correctness of a sensor, and 
completeness is characterized by the number of sensors 
from which the state is known. Thus, it is required to 
be able to monitor the state of the sensors during all 
the validation process. This is done through a vec­
tor whose elements PJ ( s;) represent the probabilities 
of failure for the sensors s;. Given that the any time 
validation process needs to be cyclic, the top level of 
the algorithm can take the form shown in Fig. 3. 
1. Initialize P1 ( s;) for all sensors s;. 
2. While there are unvalidated sensors do: 
(a) choose the next sensor to validate 
(b) validate it 
(c) update the probability of failure vector P1 
(d) measure the quality of the partial response 
Figure 3: Top level of the any time sensor validation 
algorithm. 
The probabilistic validation of a single sensor (step b) 
will be explained next in order to clarify the rest of 
the algorithm. 
4.1 Validation 
The validation step was briefly introduced in section 3 
and more extensively in [Ibargiiengoytia et al. 1996]. 
The sensors are processed one by one by the validation 
function utilizing the following algorithm: 
1. Read the actual value of the variable provided by 
the sensor. 
2. Read the value of all variables that appear in the 
Markov blanket of the selected variable. 
3. Propagate the probabilities and obtain the poste­
rior probability distribution for the selected vari­
able. 
4. If the probability (obtained in 3) of the value ac­
quired in step 1 is lower than a specified value, 
return failure; else return success 
For example, consider the simplified model of a gas tur­
bine shown in Fig. 4. The validation of m is carried 
Figure 4: A reduced Bayesian network of a gas turbine. 
out by calculating the probability distribution of m 
given the measurements oft and p. If the real value of 
sensor m has a probability greater than certain value, 
then the sensor is considered correct, and faulty oth­
erwise. However, if the fault is in sensor p, then the 
validation of m will also result in apparent fault. 
Thus, the validation step is carried out by this algo­
rithm that receives as input, the sensor that will be 
validated. As output, the algorithm returns a binary 
value { correct,faulty} with the apparent status of the 
sensor. 
4.2 Selection of next sensor 
This section develops a mathematical model for choos­
ing the best sensor to validate given the history of the 
validation process and the current state of the system. 
Also, the model proposed here will be used for measur­
ing the quality of the response in order to obtain the 
performance profile of the validation algorithm. The 
central idea is that the validation of a sensor provides 
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some information and also, extra information can be 
inferred. Therefore, a measure of the information that 
a single validation produces is required. A definition of 
the expected amount of information that an event pro­
duces was first proposed by Shannon and used in com­
munication theory [Shannon & Weaver 1949]. Shan­
non proposed the following definitions. 
Definition 4.1 Given a finite probability distribution 
Pi � 0 for (i = 1, ... , n), and L:n p; = 1 
Shannon's entropy measure is defined as 
n 
Hn=Hn( Pl,···, Pn)=-2:.,p;log2Pi (1) 
i=l 
Thus, the entropy measures the related number of bits 
required to store the information. 
Since the validation of a sensor s has two possible out­
comes, the entropy function H(s) is then defined as: 
{ 0 if p = 0 or p = 1 H(s) = -plog2(p)- (1-p)log2(1- p) otherwise 
(2) 
where p represents the probability of failure of the sen­
sor. Notice that the expression plog2(p) = 0 when 
p = 1 but it is undefined when p = 0. However, since 
plog2(p) tends to zero as p tends to zero, the values 
defined in equation 2 can be safely assumed. Notice 
that it has its maximum when p = � 'i.e., when the ig­
norance is maximum, and it is zero when either p = 0 
or p = 1, i.e., when the information is maximum and 
ignorance is minimum. This function can be consid­
ered either as a measure of the information provided 
by an experiment, or as a measure of the uncertainty 
in the experiment's outcome. Thus, considering each 
single sensor validation as an experiment, this function 
can be used to measure the amount of information pro­
vided by that validation. Then, the average amount of 
information E for the system can be defined as follows: 
1 n 
E(s1, ... ,sn) = - 2:.,H(s;) n i=l 
1 n 
= -- L PJ(s;)log2PJ(s;) 
n i=l 
+ (1- P1(s;))log2(1- PJ(s;)) 
2 n 
= -- L PJ(s;)log2PJ(s;) (3) 
n i=l 
where n is the number of sensors in the system S, 
and P1(s;) represents the current probability of fail­
ure value assigned to sensors;. Notice that the vector 
whose elements are P1 ( s;) provides a measure of the 
certainty in the validation while the sum of n indi­
vidual entropies provides a specificity measure of the 
result. 
Given this measure, the any time sensor validation al­
gorithm needs to select a sensor X that gives the best 
improvement in the average entropy of the system S. 
Hence the following conditional version of equation 3 
can be written 
E(S I X) = E(S I x = ok) + E(S I x = flty) 
= � (2:.,H( s; I x = ok) + 2:.,H(s; I x = flty)) (4) 
This function can be evaluated for each sensor and 
the one which gives the most information (the mini­
mum E(S I X;)) can be selected as the next sensor X; 
to be validated. The computation suggested by the 
above formulae could be too expensive for a real time 
sensor validation process. To overcome this problem, 
a pre compilation of the sensor selection mechanism is 
implemented as follows. The above formulae are used 
to select the sensor, Sr which gives the most informa­
tion. This selected sensor forms the root of a binary 
decision tree. A fault is simulated in this sensor and 
the formulae are again used to select the next sensor 
Sr-. Then, the root Sr is assumed to be correct, and 
the formulae are used to select the sensor Sr+ in this 
case. This results in the partial decision tree shown 
in Fig. 5. This process is repeated recursively on the 
Figure 5: Partial decision tree. 
nodes Sr- and Sr+ to obtain a complete decision tree, 
so that each path in the tree includes all the sensors. 
As an example, consider the network shown in Fig. 4. 
This process results in the decision tree shown in 
Fig. 6. Notice that this tree can be reduced considering 
Figure 6: Binary tree indicating the order of validation 
given the response of the validation step. 
only the valid trajectories formed by the assumption 
of, for example, single faults among the set of sensors. 
See [Ibargiiengoytia 1997] for more details. 
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This decision tree can be used to select the next sensor 
more efficiently in real time than by performing the 
calculations. Thus, the selection step of the algorithm 
of Fig. 3 consists of simply traversing the tree one level 
after every single sensor validation. The cycle starts 
at the root, and the decision tree points to the next 
node in the tree according to the result of validating 
the current sensor. 
4.3 Isolation 
The validation step provides only a list of potentially 
faulty sensors. Thus, a comparison is made between 
the set of potentially faulty sensors with the table of 
extended Markov blankets of all the sensors. When a 
match is found, a real fault is determined. However, 
the set of potentially faulty sensors is obtained after 
all the sensors have been validated. Therefore, in or­
der to extend that algorithm for any time behaviour, a 
different mechanism for distinguishing real faults from 
apparent ones is required. This new mechanism pro­
vides, as the output of the isolation phase, a vector 
with the probability of a real fault in all the sensors. 
This vector is refined incrementally in time, so the any 
time behaviour can be achieved. 
The any time fault isolation process is based on the 
relationship between real and apparent faults. There 
are two situations that arise: (i) the existence of a real 
fault causes an apparent fault (as shown in Fig. 7(a)), 
and (ii) one apparent fault is the manifestation of sev­
eral possible real faults (as shown in Fig. 7(b)). 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7: Causal relation between real faults (R) and 
apparent (A) faults represented as nodes. In (a), one 
real fault causes several apparent ones, while in (b), 
one apparent fault is caused by one or more real faults. 
In both figures, the relation between root nodes and 
leaf nodes is the same as the extended Markov blan­
ket (EMB) of a sensor. Considering all the sensors, 
a causal model relating the real and apparent faults 
can therefore be obtained from the fault detection 
Bayesian network (in fact, the EMB table is sufficient 
to build this network). In the first level (roots), the 
nodes represent the events of real failure in every sen­
sor. Then, the second level (leaves) is formed by nodes 
representing apparent failures in all the sensors. Arcs 
are included between every root node, and the corre­
sponding nodes of the extended Markov blanket. For 
example, the causal network shown in Fig. 8 can be 
obtained directly from the Bayesian network of the 
gas turbine given in Fig. 4. Thus, the consequences of 
Figure 8: Probabilistic causal model for fault isolation 
in the example of Fig. 4. Rt_ represents a real fault 
m sensor i while Aj represents an apparent fault in 
sensor j. 
observing an apparent fault can be propagated in the 
causal network in order to obtain the probabilities of 
a real fault in all the sensors. 
The network of Fig. 8 is multiply connected. Hence, 
the propagation method of trees of cliques is utilized 
[Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter 1988). 
In general, 0(2n) conditional probabilities would be 
required (for a node with n parents). However, the 
noisy or model can be adopted here. Two assumptions 
need to hold in order to use this model: accountability 
and exception independence [Pearl1988). 
The accountability assumption holds by the way the 
model is constructed, i.e., a sensor is apparently faulty 
only if there is a fault in its MB. The exception inde­
pendence assumption is concerned about a rare situ­
ation for this particular model. The relationship be­
tween the real and apparent faults is obtained from a 
Bayesian network in which the dependencies are as­
sumed to be strong. Hence, the probability of a real 
fault not resulting in an apparent fault is small. Fur­
ther, the mechanism by which a real fault in one sensor 
does not result in an apparent fault is even less likely 
to be dependent on another real fault. Hence, given 
that these assumptions are reasonable, the conditional 
probability matrix can be calculated by utilizing equa­
tion 5. 
(5) 
where d is the set of assignments of the set of apparent 
faults, and Td represent the set of all apparent faults 
actually present. Thus, the only parameter required is 
defined as: 
Cij = 1-% = P(Aj I R; only). 
In the case of the sensor validation problem, in an 
ideal case, all the parameters Cij � 1. Of course, these 
values can be obtained by simulation from the data 
if the problem is expected to depart from this ideal 
case. That is, according to the theory developed in 
Ibargiiengoytia et al. (1996), when a real fault Rt_ is 
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present, it will always cause the apparent fault Aj (as­
suming that there is an arc from R; to Aj). 
The network of Fig. 8 is initialized with the following 
information: (i) the prior probability of all the root 
nodes in the model is 0.5 (assuming ignorance at the 
beginning of a cycle), and (ii) the parameters Cij = 
0.99 for all 1 :::; i, j ::;number of nodes. 
Having described how real and apparent faults can be 
related, the fault isolation model can now be summa­
rized. It receives as an input, a validated sensor with 
its detected state (faulty or correct) and updates the 
probability of failure of all the sensors. It does this by 
instantiating the value of the corresponding apparent 
node and using a propagation algorithm to obtain the 
posterior probabilities of the real faulty nodes. A vec­
tor Pf of these posterior probabilities represents the 
current state of knowledge about the sensors, and can 
be viewed as the output of the system at any time. 
For example, assuming a fault in g in the network of 
Fig. 4, produces the sequence of values of the proba­
bility vector as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Example of the values of the probability vec­
tor Pf. 
Step Pr(m) Pr(t) Pr(P) Pr(g) P1(a) 
t =faulty 0.534 0.534 0.5 0.534 0.534 
m = correct 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.663 0.663 
g =faulty 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.99 0.502 
a= correct 0.009 0.0 0.009 0.999 0.009 
p =correct 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.999 0.009 
4.4 Quality measure 
A measure that is independent of the application is 
the average entropy of the sensors given in equation 3. 
That is, if the current quality measure is: 
2 n 
Q(s1, ... , sn) == -- L Pj(si)log2Pj(si) (6) n i=l 
then, the reported quality function is calculated with 
the formula Q = 9maxQ9current where Qmax is the 
maximum value of the q�
·
;lity measure (i.e., n, the 
number of nodes). Notice that this measure captures 
both the certainty and specificity measures of any time 
algorithms. It captures certainty since the probabili­
ties of the sensors are used, and specificity since all 
the sensors are combined to give an average. Figure 9 
shows the performance profile obtained with this qual­
ity measure for the example of Fig 4. 
5 Empirical Results 
The sensor validation algorithm was evaluated by ap­
plying it to the validation of temperature sensors of 
the gas turbine at the Gomez Palacio power plant in 
1. 1. 
time 
(a) (b) 
Figure 9: Performance profile describing the combi­
nation of certainty and specificity in one parameter 
against time. (a) without failure, (b) with a simulated 
failure in sensor g. 
Mexico. A Bayesian network representing the depen­
dencies between the sensors of the plant is shown in 
Fig. 10. The dependency model was obtained by uti­
lizing an automatic learning program that uses real 
data from the start up phase of the turbine [Sucar et 
al. 1997]. 
Figure 10: Probabilistic tree of the application. Nodes 
represent temperature signals of a gas turbine. 
The data set was partitioned in two subsets: one parti­
tion for training the network, and the other partition 
for testing. The training/testing partition used was 
70-30% of the original data set, i.e., 610 instances for 
training the model (calculating the prior and condi­
tional probabilities), and 260 instances for testing. 
Theoretically, the system should always detect and iso­
late single faults correctly. However, in reality, some 
errors may occur since in practice it is unlikely that the 
dependency model will be perfect. Consequently, two 
types of errors could occur: a correct reading might 
be considered faulty, and a real fault might not be de­
tected. These two possible errors are called type I and 
type II errors in the literature, and defined as follows 
[Cohen 1995]: 
type I: rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true, 
type II: acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is 
actually false. 
The null hypothesis used refers to the hypothesis that 
a sensor is working properly. Thus, in other words, 
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type I errors occur when a correct sensor is reported 
as faulty while type II errors occur when faulty sensors 
are not detected. 
The criteria for deciding if a reading is faulty or not 
can result in a trade off between these two types of 
errors. The criteria considered in this project are the 
following: 
1. Calculate the distance of the real value from the 
expected value, and map it to faulty if it is beyond 
a specified threshold and to correct if it is less 
than a specified threshold. The threshold values 
considered were 2, 2.5 and 3 times the standard 
deviation rr. 
2. Assume that the sensor is working properly and 
establish a confidence level at which this hypoth­
esis can be rejected, in which case it can be con­
sidered faulty. This confidence level is known as 
the p value. The p values considered were 0.05 
and 0.01. 
The accuracy of the model, i.e., the proportion of type 
I and II errors, is evaluated by varying the possible 
thresholds for each of these criteria. 
Two different faults were simulated: 
Severe. The sensor value modified is the most distant 
extreme value, i.e., the real value is substituted by 
one which differs by minimum 50 %. 
Mild. The real value is replaced by one which differs 
by 25 %. 
A test procedure was used to evaluate the accuracy 
of the whole validation process. Table 2 presents the 
final evaluation of the prototype with the percentage 
of type I and II errors for severe and mild faults. 
Criteria 
Type I 
Type II 
Type I 
Type II 
Type I errors imply that most of the sensors in a EMB 
present apparent type I errors. This is more common 
as it can be seen in Table 2. That is, there are cases 
where the existence of an invalid apparent fault, to­
gether with the valid ones, completes the EMB of a 
misdiagnosed sensor. Hence, a type I error is pro­
duced. On the contrary, type II errors are detected at 
this stage when most of the sensors of a EMB present 
misdiagnosed apparent faults. This is very improba­
ble as the results of Table 2 confirms. The percentages 
are obtained comparing the average number of errors, 
with the total number of experiments. 
6 Discussion 
Section 4.2 developed an any time sensor validation 
algorithm that utilizes an entropy function as a cri­
terion for selecting the next sensor to validate. This 
entropy function calculates the amount of information 
that any single validation provides for diagnosing all 
the sensors. Hence, to evaluate this criterion, this sec­
tion compares the performance profile of the any time 
sensor validation algorithm as a function of time when 
the entropy based measure is used, and when a random 
selection scheme is used. 
Figure 11 shows the resultant performance profile of 
the any time sensor validation algorithm. That is, the 
0.9 
o.s 
0.7 
£0.6 
� 0.5 
(J 0.4 
0.3 
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0.1 
10.32 
x-x 
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Figure 11: Performance profile of the any time sensor 
validation algorithm (timex 10-2sec.). 
quality of the response as a function of time. An ex­
periment consisted in the simulation of a single fault. 
Thus, 21 independent experiments were necessary to 
simulate a fault in all the sensors. In total, 260 exper­
iments were carried out, so every one of the 21 sensors 
was simulated faulty at least 12 times (12.6 times). 
The entropy graph represents the average of the resul­
tant quality with the entropy based scheme for the 21 
sensors of Fig. 10. The random graph represents the 
average of the same experiment with a random selec­
tion scheme. The time axis is a qualitative comparison 
rather than quantitative. 
Alternatively, the results can also be evaluated by com­
paring the time required to reach different levels of 
quality. For example in Fig. 11, when the random cri­
terion reaches 60 % of quality, the entropy criterion 
has already reached more than 80 %. 
The approach has been implemented and is being 
tested on the validation of temperature sensors in a 
gas turbine of a combined cycle power plant. The re­
sults for the accuracy of the model were reported in 
terms of the type I and type II errors and with re­
spect to detecting severe and mild faults. The results 
showed, that for this particular test application, more 
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stringent criteria for detecting failures reduced type I 
errors but did not significantly increase type II errors. 
The results of the evaluation of the validation and iso­
lation phases together are shown in Table 2. Again, 
with a p value of 0.01, there are 2.9% of type I errors, 
and 0.4 % type II errors. Notice that, in general, the 
sensor validation algorithm performs almost perfectly 
with respect to undetected faulty sensors, i.e., all the 
faults are detected. At the same time, the rate of in­
correct detection faults is satisfactory for most of the 
criteria analyzed. 
Two complexity aspects need to be discussed. The first 
one is the size of the pre compliled decision tree pre­
sented in section 4.2. A binary tree for n sensors con­
tains n levels and up to 2n-l nodes (1,048,575 nodes 
for 21 sensors). However, if a single fault is assumed, 
then the decision tree results in a pruned tree with 
n levels and at most n x ( n + 1) nodes. The second 
· one is the complexity for probability propagation in 
the fault isolation network as in Fig. 8. The propaga­
tion complexity (using the clostering algorithm [Lau­
ritzen & Spiegelhalter 1988]), depends on the the size 
of the largest entry of the EM B table, i.e., the largest 
clique. However, if a tree is assumed for the detection 
Bayesian network, the number of nodes in the EM B 
table remains small, i.e., just one parent and the chil­
dren of a node. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has presented an any time, probabilistic 
algorithm for sensor validation. A layered approach is 
considered where the lowest layer performs the valida­
tion. A Bayesian network is used to define the relation­
ships between variables and to estimate the expected 
value of a sensor. The expected value is then compared 
with the actual reading obtained. If these measures 
differ then a faulty sensor is suspected. A faulty sensor 
is then distinguished from apparently faulty sensors by 
the use of a property based on the Markov blanket. 
An any time version of the validation algorithm, that 
improves the quality of its answer incrementally, has 
also been presented. This any time algorithm uses a 
causal network to distinguish the real fault from the 
apparent ones. The any time behaviour is obtained 
with the selection of the sensor that provides more 
information when validated. The selection is made 
with the entropy function. 
The evaluation of the any time behaviour of the al­
gorithm presented in this paper was done by carrying 
out experiments to obtain the performance profile of 
the entropy based selection scheme and comparing it 
with a random selection scheme. 
Future research will attempt to use the probabilities 
obtained in the fault detection Bayesian network, as 
the input to the fault isolation Bayesian network. At 
this stage, the output of the detection network consists 
in a binary value ({correct, faulty}). 
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